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e x p e r i e n c e s o f c o n f l i c t , f o r m a t i o n s o f 
i d e n t i t y 
Megan Adamson Sijapati 
With Nepal's recent transition to state secularism, the politicization of 
Muslim religious identity has emerged with increasing vitality. One particular 
pan-Nepali Muslim organization, the Rastriya Muslim Mane Nepal (National 
Muslim Forum Nepal), offers a window into the complex relationship 
between national and religious identity that animates this politicization. 
Through analysis of the National Muslim Forum's earliest discourses, pro-
duced between 2005 and 2006, both immediately before and after the people's 
revolution that resulted in the declaration of Nepal as a secular state, this 
essay highlights the ways that experiences of conflict coupled with a national 
political transition shape and contribute to this politicization. It also offers a 
picture of some of the ways in which conceptions of the nation and religious 
community come together to help define the forum's call for a new Muslim 
religio-political identity across a diverse Nepali national population.1 
Muslims in Nepal 
Muslims are the second largest religious minority in Nepal, and constitute 4.2 
percent of Nepal's population according to the 2001 census data.2 The 
majority of Muslims in Nepal are Sunni and identify as Hanafi, the legal 
school predominant in South Asia.3 Within these two broad religiously-
determined categories of identification, however, Muslims in Nepal tend to 
cast their own identities in more narrow and specific categories of affiliation 
such as doctrinal orientation, ethnicity, occupation, region, and educational 
level, each of which involves its own internal divisions and hierarchies. In the 
Kathmandu valley, which is home to only a small percentage of Nepal's 
Muslims but represents a social and religious microcosm of the Muslim 
population, Muslims are divided most broadly between Kashmiris, whose 
presence in Nepal dates back as early as the sixteenth century, and those 
known alternately as "Hindustani," (as earlier literature calls them) or 
"Nepali" Muslims (i.e. from the Tarai). In addition, there are several smaller 
populations of Tibetan Muslims, "Kathmandu" (alternately called Newari, or 
Iraqi) Muslims, and Churaute Muslims in the valley. In the Tarai, where the 
majority of the country's Muslims reside, some are descendents of local 
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converts as far back as the Delhi Sultanate.4 Many Muslims of the northern 
hill regions are of the bangle-making Churaute ethnic group, whose ancestors 
migrated from India centuries ago. Divisions within these affiliations abound 
to such an extent that many Muslims themselves describe their national 
population as fragmented, dispersed, and sometimes unwieldy in its diversity. 
The most pronounced divisions within Nepal's Muslim population are 
those based on doctrinal orientation and geographic location. Doctrinally, 
Muslims oriented towards particular schools of thought, particularly Barelvi,5 
Deobandi,6 Ahl-c Hadis,7 and Jamaat-i Islami,8 tend to see themselves as 
distinct from one another. Geographically, Muslims of the hills and the 
Kathmandu valley see themselves as culturally distinct from Muslims of the 
Tarai. This regional divide between the pahari Muslims and the madhesi 
Muslims, which is felt in the Kathmandu valley, is perhaps the most intract-
able of divisions among Muslims in Nepal, as it is part of a larger issue of 
social, political, and cultural tension in Nepal between Paharis and Madhesis. 
In the Kathmandu valley, there is a perception of Madhesis as more Indian in 
essence than Nepali. By extension, Madhesi linguistic, cultural, and social tics 
with north Indians make for a perception among pahari and Kathmandu 
valley Muslims that madhesi Muslims are "less Nepali" than pahari Muslims 
because they are even further from the Hindu pahari-orientcd national iden-
tity.9 Within the Kathmandu valley there are also further, significant divisions 
between the Kashmiri Muslims and "Hindustani", or "Nepali," Muslims who 
have more recently emigrated there. According to many Muslims, few in 
recent memory have reached across these boundaries to cultivate cooperation 
and communication on a national scale. 
The National Muslim Forum Nepal 
The National Muslim Forum Nepal was created in 2005 as a pan-Nepali 
Muslim organization. Founded not as a religious or social service organiza-
tion, but rather as a centralized platform for a unified Muslim voice, the 
forum aimed to unify and communicate Muslim needs to the government at 
the national level. It offered a vision of Nepali Muslim unity in which the 
Nepali Muslim population at large was conceived as a "nation," or commu-
nity, whose survival would be dependent upon the Nepali state of which it is a 
part. Now in its sixth year of existence, the National Muslim Forum con-
tinues to offer this vision of a new, forward-looking, pan-Nepali Muslim 
identity articulated most clearly in its founding discourses. 
Upon its conception, the National Muslim Forum called for Muslims 
throughout the country to unite across the divides of regionalism, doctrinal 
affiliation, and ethnicity by recognizing fundamental commonalities among 
one another. Its founding documents describe it as being founded with the 
primary objectives of "protecting] and cultivating] the religious, economic, 
social, and cultural benefits of the Muslim community in Nepal ... with an 
aim to consolidate the age-long tradition of religious tolerance and the feeling 
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of brotherhood among the people of Nepal" (National Muslim Forum Nepal 
2005b: 1). It called for "essential coordination, cooperation, and collabora-
tion ... with Muslim organizations" (National Muslim Forum Nepal 2005b: 
3) and membership would be open to Muslims of all sects or schools of 
thought (U., maktabi filer). 
As its leaders describe it, the forum's broad sweeping call for unity and 
cooperation emerged in direct response to the incident in August of 2004 that 
came to be called Kalo Buddhvar, or "Black Wednesday." On that day, pro-
tests and riots that included well-orchestrated, incendiary, and highly sym-
bolic anti-Muslim violence broke out throughout the Kathmandu valley in 
response to an Islamic terrorist group's murdering of twelve Nepali men 
working in Iraq.10 At multiple sites in the Kathmandu valley, organized 
bands of rioters, who were later identified with the Nepal branch of the 
Hindu nationalist organization Shiv Sena, launched a coordinated attack on 
all people and things seen as connected to Islam (Sijapati 2011). This inclu-
ded Muslim religious leaders, business owners, and householders, and 
Muslim-owned businesses, manpower recruitment agencies, gulf airlines, and 
the Egyptian embassy. Rioters paraded the streets chanting anti-Muslim slo-
gans, broke in to mosques and burned and urinated upon Qurans and threw 
them out into the street, vandalized mosque interiors, and attacked madrasas 
(Islamic religious schools). 
The anti-Muslim violence of Kalo Buddhvar was the first on record to 
occur in the Kathmandu valley, and it differed on several levels from past 
incidents of religious violence in other regions of Nepal. Violent confronta-
tions between Hindus and Muslims had occurred in the Tarai districts of 
Mahottari, Rautahat, Bara, Dang, and Banke (Dastider 2000) - all areas with 
significant Muslim populations and close to the Indian border - in the second 
half of the twentieth century. In Nepalgunj, five violent conflicts took place 
between Hindus and Muslims between 1992 and 1997 (Lawoti 2007). The 
violence of Kalo Buddhvar, however, was uni-dircctional - Muslims did not 
retaliate - and it was in an geographic area more removed from the con-
tentious issues in northern regions of India that have influenced Hindu-
Muslim relations in Tarai districts in the past, such as the Babri Masjid dis-
pute. Kalo Buddhvar was sparked by an event that took place far outside 
Nepal's borders but struck a deep emotional chord with many Nepalis per-
haps because of the large number of Nepalis working in the Arab Gulf. And 
while public protests are common in Nepal, these are usually political 
expressions of dissent and do not target one segment of the population. On 
Kalo Buddhvar, rioters targeted Ghanta Ghar (N., "clock house"), the valley's 
main Islamic area and a centrally located base for Nepal's two largest and 
most influential Muslim organizations, which lies just down the road from the 
Royal palace. The two mosques there, which are the valley's largest, were 
broken into and vandalized, and mosques all across the valley, from Imadol 
to Patan to Kalimati, were attacked as well. When I visited the Ahl-e Hadis 
mosque in Kalimati in early 2006, the extensive damage from Kalo Buddhvar 
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was still evident. Fire damage was visible on the mosque walls and a stack of 
charred Qurans remained covered in the corner of one of the rooms. The son 
of the mosque's former Imam (prayer leader) explained that the blackened 
Qurans remained there only because no one knew the proper Islamic way to 
dispose of damaged Qurans. Prior to the attacks, the mosque's small boarding 
school had drawn Muslim students from villages outside of the valley, but 
following Kalo Buddhvar, few parents felt safe keeping their children there 
and the school was forced to close. 
At the time of Kalo Buddhvar, many Muslims saw it as the community's 
breaking point in the long suffered institutional injustices and discrimination 
faced over the years of recent memory (Sijapati 2011). In addition to having 
no place in Nepal's national narrative and identity, little political voice, and 
few resources for educational development, in the months prior to Kalo 
Buddhvar Muslims had experienced an alarming elevation in discriminatory 
incidents aimed at members of their community. The clearest example of this 
was the arrest and detainment of seven madrasa teachers from various parts 
of the country. They were held for several months under the pretense that the 
schools in which they were teaching served as training centers for Islamic 
extremists with links to terrorist outfits such as al-Qaeda (Adhikari 2004; 
Rajdhani Rashtryia Dainik 2004). 
Only in 1963 were Muslims recognized by the state as a separate religious 
group and given status as citizens equal before the law. The first national 
Muslim organization on record, the All Nepal Anjuman Islah, was formed in 
1953 to work towards the "social and economic development of Muslims in 
Nepal" (Ansari 1981: 31). Another early organization, still active today, was 
the Millat-e Islamiya," established in 1971 "to facilitate the Islamic sur-
rounding and [promote] Islamic awareness throughout the whole country" 
(ibid.: 38). In the mid 1990s, a nation-wide organization called the All Nepal 
Ettehad Sangh held national meetings and brought Muslim representatives 
from all districts to pass resolutions pertaining to Muslims (Dastider 2000). 
By the late 1990s, however, it was no longer holding national meetings. On 
Kalo Buddhvar, it appeared to many that no one, not even the government, 
would protect Muslims from such large-scale organized expressions of vio-
lence against them. There was even widespread suspicion that King Gyancndra 
had sanctioned the anti-Muslim attacks of Kalo Buddhvar. In the views of its 
senior leaders, the National Muslim Forum's goal to draw together a unified 
Muslim voice into a political platform for representing the interests of the 
nation's diverse Muslim population was conceived in direct response to these 
experiences of discrimination and violence. 
In a beginning that symbolized the heterogeneity of voices to be included in 
the National Muslim Forum's one unified voice, its leaders came from various 
schools of South Asian Islamic thought, geographic regions, and ethnic 
groups of Nepal. The greatest representation was from Muslims oriented 
towards reformist schools of thought, particularly Ahl-e Hadis, Deoband, 
and Jamaat-e Islami, and many of the leaders and members of the forum 
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were also (and continue to be) active figures in the Islami Sangh Nepal, the 
country's largest and most influential Islamic religious organization (Sijapati 
2011). Its leaders came from regions stretching from the Tarai districts of 
Kapilvastu, Sunsari, and Morang to the capital of Kathmandu and the hill 
district of Gorkha. There are also members of the Kashmiri Muslim com-
munity in the forum, though Muslims who claim the Tarai as their vatan 
(U., homeland, native country) were in the majority in the forum upon its 
conception. A number of Muslims who frequent the offices of the Millat-e 
Islami in Ghanta Ghar, and are both members of the National Muslim 
Forum and part of the core of the Islami Sangh leadership, are from the 
eastern Tarai district of Sunsari. 
At the time of the forum's first annual meeting in December of 2005, the 
political future of the country was highly uncertain. King Gyanendra was 
grasping to maintain his position of absolute power while the Maoists and 
Nepal's seven political parties were putting increasing pressure on him to 
abdicate the throne and restore the country to its status as a parliamentary 
democracy. Muslims, like many others in Nepal, were energized by the 
growing movement for the re-institution of democracy and the imminent 
transformation into a secular state. Muslims were motivated by the sense of 
exigency in productively responding to the religious violence committed 
against them, and by the broad national energy that was accumulating as the 
possibility of the end of King Gyancndra's rule looked increasingly likely. 
Among Muslims associated with the organizations based out of Ghanta 
Ghar, there was anticipation for what political future would lie ahead. This 
was combined with excitement and concern for the importance of this 
unprecedented opportunity to participate in the political process and gain 
greater recognition and rights as the country's second largest religious min-
ority. Muslims anticipated the opening of a new space within the popular 
political discourse, in which they not only could contribute their voice, but 
were required to do so in order to ensure what they saw as their rightful place 
in the future multireligious, multiethnic, secular state. 
At its first annual meeting, the forum's leaders formally presented its aims 
and objectives to a Muslim audience in eloquent speeches delivered by the 
forum's President and General Secretary (which were later published by the 
organization and are cited in the following pages). These goals were couched 
within the forum's reflections on the condition of Muslims in Nepal at the 
time. Their speeches addressed the nature of Nepali Muslims' problems and 
the necessity of Muslims to come together and create a laudable and persua-
sive voice of protest to the government. Concerns with Nepal's political 
instability, the vulnerability of its Muslim community, and the Muslim place 
within the country's future shaped the speeches of this countrywide Muslim 
gathering. A few months later, these aims were reformulated as demands to 
the new government, published in both Urdu and Nepali and distributed 
from Ghanta Ghar. The front of the forum's glossy pamphlet publication 
illustrates the multiple orientations of Nepali Muslims, all of which informed 
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the concerns of the forum's speeches: a sketch of the Himayalan mountains 
stretched above the forum's logo of a crescent moon (the hilal, a multifaceted 
symbol of Islam) cradling the word Allah (God, written in Arabic) and an 
outline of the geographic boundaries of Nepal - all encircled by the forum's 
name written both in English and Nepali above the forum's title in large Urdu 
script. 
Visions of a unified identity 
One of the National Muslim Forum's central goals was to make clear to 
Nepal's Muslims that, despite their diversity, they were already unified by 
virtue of their dual commitments to their religion and the Nepali state. The 
forum called for Nepal's ethnically, linguistically, geographically, and reli-
giously heterogeneous Muslim population to recognize a latent commonality 
and a communal responsibility, each informed by religion and political 
necessity. To this end, it called for Nepali Muslims to understand themselves 
as a community, or "nation," (U., millat, qaum) of Muslims within the nation 
(U., muluky2 of Nepal. According to the forum's first President, the cultiva-
tion of a unified Muslim community identity would amount to no less than a 
"resurrection" of the "Muslim qaum (nation, community)" (National Muslim 
Forum Nepal 2005b: 17). This, he explained, would be part of the larger 
project of transforming the state of Nepal itself, which was in early 2004 in 
the throes of "destruction" (ibid.: 23). The survival and prosperity of both 
"nations" - Nepal and its Muslims - he argued, would be contingent upon 
the growth and strengthening of the other. 
How the forum conceives of these two "nations" is revealed by the choice 
of terms it employs to discuss them. To refer to the state of Nepal, the Forum 
uses the Arabic-derived Nepali term muluk. There is nothing distinctly Islamic 
about the forum's use of the term muluk; Nepali contains a number of words 
derived from Arabic and Persian, and the use of muluk in Nepali dates back 
to the early nineteenth century. The earliest legal code of the land was the 
Muluki Ain. Whether in the form of a Hindu kingdom or a secular republic, 
the term muluk denotes the country as a whole, perhaps best understood as 
the state, specifically with citizens with equal rights and obligations. 
For the "nation," or community, of Nepali Muslims, however, the forum 
uses two Urdu (Arabic-derived) terms: millat and qaum. These terms can be 
interpreted in various ways, depending on the context, to denote sub-groups 
delineated by ethnicity, race, or tribe. The Urdu term millat is derived from 
the Arabic term malla, meaning "to turn, to convert," and has the dual 
meanings of "religion, faith, creed" and "a nation, people" (Platts 1960: 1064). 
The forum uses the term millat in the sense of those of one faith, i.e. Islam, 
therefore "ek millat" in the sense of "all those of the Islamic faith" in Nepal. 
The term qaum is also used frequently in the forum's speeches and other 
discourses, and its use bears particular significance. Qaum, which is used in 
the Quran in connection with Muhammad's predecessors, i.e. the Prophets of 
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the Abrahamic lineage, signifies "a people, a nation" (ibid.: 796), and is 
used to denote the "modern conception of 'people'," (Kassis 1983: 948-54; 
Wensinck 2007), the smaller groups of people within the greater global 
community of Muslims, the umma, who identify with one another both as 
Muslims and, in narrower terms, as communities bound by ties of race, 
ethnicity, geography, and culture. It can be used in the sense of a religious 
community, a nation, or even caste, and it has been defined in varying ways 
among South Asian Muslims in the past. The forum uses the terms millat and 
qaum to describe the Muslim population as it imagines it: as an ideal com-
munity unified by the ties of religion, yet heterogeneous; a community, or 
"nation," of Muslims, within the larger group of citizens comprising the 
nation-state of Nepal. 
Participating in the shaping of the new democratic and secular state 
required Muslims, as both marginalized citizens and members of a religion 
with a complicated relationship to ideologies such as nationalism, to grapple 
with the very concept of the nation-state. As bearers of a unique - and in 
ways significantly contrasting - religion and religious identity, Muslims would 
not see themselves as fitting into the nation-state of Nepal as defined by the 
Hindu-majority. Their experiences as marginalized members of the histori-
cally Hindu state and society render them outside the dominant national 
narrative. Further, for Muslims in South Asia, the concept of nationhood, 
and Muslim identity within the nation, is fraught with overtones of compli-
cated historical struggles. The ideal relationship between religion and politics 
in Islam has been the source of great debate and conflict among Muslims 
(Hardy 1972). 
It is significant then that the forum uses the word qaum to describe 
Muslims in Nepal, as a whole, irrespective of their more specific ethnic, geo-
graphic, and cultural ties. This marks a move towards unifying the various 
qaums - sub-groups of Nepali Muslims delineated by ties of ethnicity, race, 
geography, etc. - that are constituted through these very ties and that exist 
inherently within the Nepali Muslim population, into a larger qaum based on 
religious identity. In one sense, the forum understands this ideal Nepali 
Muslim "nation," or community, this qaum, to be based first on the ties of 
Nepali citizenship, and then narrowed through the bond of religion, rather 
than through the ties of ethnicity, language, or geography. 
Whether understood metaphorically, as a united people, or literally, as a 
distinct political minority functioning as a micronation within a larger nation-
state, the articulation of Muslims in Nepal as a "nation" would require dis-
cursive efforts at conceptualizing a new community. What is to draw Nepali 
Muslims out of - or just beyond - their local ethnic, geographic and doc-
trinal-based identities based on ethnicity, language, geography, or doctrine 
and into the larger identification as members of a pan-Nepali Muslim com-
munity, or "nation"? The forum claims that this larger identification has 
many sources. Two of these are significant for our understanding of the 
relationship between religion and nation for Muslims: experiences of 
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hardship and violence, and a sense of belonging to and responsibility for the 
state of Nepal. 
These two foundations for national Muslim identity were elaborated upon 
in the speeches given at the forum's first annual meeting. The President 
explained to his fellow Nepali Muslims that the country was "going through 
a delicate time in its history," (National Muslim Forum Nepal 2005b: 24) and 
that all Muslims were feeling it. Nepal, he held, was once a model for peace, 
but now only a place void of "peace and security," where the "sanctity of life 
and the security of property" had "become rare concepts]" (ibid.: 23). He 
lamented: 
Our country, which was an example for peace and a place of safety, of 
complete beauty, a central attraction for tourists, with the snow-capped 
peaks of the Himalayas and Mount Everest, used to be world famous. 
Now, it is like a deserted, ripe autumn valley where the holiness of the 
honor and security of life and property has become a joke. Man is man's 
enemy and people of the nation have begun to drink each other's blood. 
The poison of cruelty has already penetrated the hearts of the sons of the 
nation in such a way that the security and the honor of ordinary citizens 
and countrymen have no reality beyond our dreams. The entire country is 
kept like an abundance of gunpowder and from one quick spark can 
change into a spreading fire. 
(Ibid.: 24) 
As the forum saw it, the social cohesion and integrity of Nepal was in an 
unprecedented state of volatility, evidenced by Kalo Buddhvar. Nepal faced 
the alarming rise of the Maoist insurgency, the instability and new aggres-
siveness of King Gyanendra's government, recent anti-Muslim violence by 
Hindu extremists (thought to be tacitly condoned by the King) and the other 
pandemic problems of poverty and under-development, all exacerbated by a 
web of government corruption. Kalo Buddhvar, the President suggested, was a 
painful example - and consequence - of this volatility, for by a small spark (i.e. 
the murder of Nepali workers in Iraq) the country, because of its instability 
and corruption, gave way to violence that targeted some of its least prepared 
and most vulnerable citizens: its Muslims. 
In painting the political situation of Nepal in such stark terms, the Pre-
sident made it clear that the political stability of the country was of vital 
concern to its minority of Muslims whose primary loyalty may be to either 
religion or state, but whose conditions were, regardless, determined by condi-
tion of the country. The President underscored the shared sense of sorrow 
among Muslims and their fellow Nepalis for the country's political, eco-
nomic, and social problems, and proclaimed that from this sorrow should 
follow a shared desire among Muslims for Nepal to prosper. He explained, 
"we [Muslims] respect [this country's] growth and development," for "we arc 
this country's responsible people and wise citizens" (ibid.: 22-23). 
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However, he reminded his listeners that Muslim reverence for the homeland 
of Nepal is not like that of Nepali Hindus for whom the land bears a special 
religious significance as a locus of religio-mythical narrative and sacredness.'3 
Muslim loyalty to the state and land of Nepal docs not supercede loyalty to 
religion and religious identity. He explains that "we arc not worshippers of 
our birthplace (U., vatan), but when our hearts are filled with feelings for our 
country then naturally with its development our hearts are happy and with its 
destruction we feel pains of grief (ibid.: 23). 
It is important to note here that the forum articulates a pan-Nepali Muslim 
religious identity that it sees as distinctly not ethnic. This is in part because as 
forum leaders see it, Islamic sacred sources call for social egalitarianism 
through submission to a path of action-based devotion to a monotheistic 
God, in which there is no room for the idolization of ethnic or racial iden-
tities. While this scriptural ideal may fail to translate into consistent social 
reality, Muslims of the forum espouse a socially egalitarian brotherhood of 
Islam as the core of Muslim society. However there are other reasons that the 
forum works to ensure that the pan-Nepali identity they are calling for is not 
taken to be ethnic. Unlike for many of Nepal's ethnic groups, for Muslims, 
their claims to political rights and socio-cultural recognition (as represented 
by the National Muslim Forum) are not, and cannot, be grounded in the 
status of being indigenous to the territory of Nepal. Further, their hetero-
geneity and the ethically driven principles of Muslim social equality men-
tioned above prevent them from claiming an ethnic unity based on any racial, 
linguistic, or cultural traits that would be essentially "Nepali Muslim." They 
therefore navigate a complex identity - as so many minority religious groups 
do - rooted in their belonging to Nepal and their membership in a global 
religious community whose roots are outside of Nepal. For Nepal's Muslims, 
despite the existence of local sites of sacred geography such as saints' shrines 
(which are located across the country, and the veneration of which is coming 
under increasing criticism by Islamic reformers and revivalists, many of whom 
are part of the National Muslim Forum), the larger sacred geography of 
Islam is necessarily extra-territorial. This translocal orientation is most simply 
demonstrated in their facing the direction of the Kaba in Mecca during their 
five daily prayers. Other, more tangible markers of their translocal orientation 
include Muslims' sacred text, as it is in a non-lndo-Aryan language (the 
Quran can be translated from Arabic into another languages, and has been 
recently translated into Nepali with the support of the forum and other 
organizations, but in translation it is no longer considered the actual sacred 
text, but rather a rendering of meaning of the text), and the use of Urdu, the 
national language of Pakistan and linguistic cultural carrier of Islam in South 
Asia, as a pan-Nepali Muslim language. 
As understood by many of Nepal's reform and revival oriented Muslims, 
who arc in large number in the forum, the practices and epistemologies of 
Islamic religious tradition remain located outside the cultural-religious com-
plex of historical Nepal. Aware of the way this extra-territorial orientation 
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may be perceived by Nepal's non-Muslims, the Forum works to make explicit 
Muslims' Nepali identity (both to Muslims and non-Muslims) in practical 
terms through the participation in the social and political discourses pertain-
ing to the formation of the new secular state (Sijapati 2011). Symbolically, it 
communicates their connection with the geography of Nepal, for example, in 
their logo (described earlier), which features a sketch of the Himalayas, the 
territorial boundaries of Nepal, and a crescent moon. 
In its first meeting, the forum's President explained that Nepali Muslim 
concerns with what they sec as the country's rapidly declining political and 
social conditions can compel movement towards an active, unified Muslim 
voice in the country through participation in its development as a secular 
state. He explained that the Muslim population would need to come together 
to recognize the dire situation that enabled Kalo Buddhvar to occur, and take 
on their responsibilities as both Nepali citizens and Muslims in addressing it. 
He explained to them that through a unified platform they must rise above 
their petty concerns with "personal benefits and our group and sect bigotries" 
and come together to "raise a voice only for the [Muslim] nation's (U., millat) 
greater welfare" (ibid.: 24). 
Muslims could save themselves in and through the rescue of the Nepali 
nation-state, and this would be a foundation for unity. This is significant, for 
historically, Muslims were designated by those in power as foreigners, by 
virtue of being outside the Hindu hierarchy that defined the social, legal, and 
religious structure of the state. Through the caste based hierarchy of the Muluki 
Ain, put into effect in 1854 and influential until very recently, Nepali Muslims 
were grouped together through a broad-sweeping political and social identity 
as groups of "impure but touchable" castes, despite the fact that they bore 
few commonalities beyond a broad religious affiliation. By 2006, with the 
juridical dissolution of a Hindu caste-based social and legal hierarchy, which 
remains in existence informally, the National Muslim Forum posited a new 
basis for a broad pan-Nepali Muslim identity defined not through exclusion, but 
through inclusion in the national project for stability and prosperity, despite 
the many internal divisions that still abound among the Muslim population. 
In the forum's view, the situation of the Muslim crisis and the country's 
political crisis - dual crises of different natures but intertwined - should 
compel in Muslims a sense of responsibility to the development of the nation 
for the prosperity of the multination state as well. The condition and future of 
each was intertwined, and the raising of the Muslim "nation" would con-
tribute - rather than present challenge - to the development of the Nepali 
nation-state. In this way, the National Muslim Forum presented a vision for 
Nepali Muslim identity in this early period of political transition. Through 
this vision, informed by the experiences of political instability and religious 
violence within the country, it argued that the Muslim population possesses a 
foundation for commonality that could be harnessed for a new, unified identity -
one inherently Nepali, entirely Muslim, and aimed at their very preservation 
and future as Muslims in a non-Islamic state. 
112 Megan Adamson Sijapati 
A path to the "resurrection of the nation" 
The National Muslim Forum laid out specific methods through which the 
population's unified identity could be further cultivated. I will address only a 
selection of them here, with a focus less on the explicitly religious points in 
preference for the more politically-oriented ones (though the two are often 
difficult to disentangle). At a basic level, the forum asserted that while differ-
ences within the population were healthy, the intra-communal biases and 
tensions that plague it would have to be ameliorated. In order to affect social 
change, the forum argued, Nepali Muslims, the Islamic nation or community 
(the term used is Islami millat), would need to outwardly reflect cohesion and 
strength to the society at large, while remaining internally heterogeneous. The 
forum condoned the doctrinal diversity (or rather, divisions, as many would 
prefer to call it) within Nepal's "Muslim nation" by emphasizing their 
common commitment to fundamental religious principles above and beyond 
sectarian, doctrinal differences. "It is not a fault for there to be differences in 
any group," the President explained, and as a solution "Islam has laid out the 
best community (ummat) for us" (ibid.: 10). Differences within the community 
would have to be embraced, he held: "by way of our own affiliations [i.e. 
Dcobandi, Barelvi, etc.] and relations we must follow our own religious 
schools of thought/sectarian affiliation [U., masalik]" (ibid.: 20). Contingent 
upon this, however, would be the responsibility of members of the Muslim 
population to take on one another other's problems and challenges, as the 
forum's goal of presenting "Muslims' demands and necessities before the 
current government" would not be possible "through individual efforts" 
(ibid.: 26). It would require that "wherever a matter arises that is a problem of 
the entire society, we [must] be united in every way and give life and limb for 
the solution. In this the secret of our perpetuity is hidden, and in this the 
safety of our identity is also secure" (ibid.: 19). 
In the forum's view, this unification could bring in a new era, and since all 
else has failed thus far in the history of Muslim development14 in Nepal, 
nothing but good could come from this new approach: 
Come—now at this stage we should do a new experiment, we should 
show our unity and power, and in the strength of our unprecedented unity 
in this country we should write a new history ... and there is no reason 
why, upon dropping our small discords and prejudices between masalik 
for the more extensive benefits of the [Muslim] nation, we should not be 
able to be one. 
(Ibid.: 19) 
The forum cites one recent harnessing of this dormant unity of the Muslim 
community: the successful fundraising efforts among the country's Muslims 
for the victims of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. The collection of over 
600,000 rupees for the support of fellow Muslims outside of Nepal was 
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"proof that on the one hand the collective heart of the [Nepali Muslim] 
nation (U., qaum) has not died yet and the desires of our Islamic brotherhood 
have not grown cold. On the other hand, it is proof that the individuals of the 
[Nepali Muslim] nation are fully ready to welcome our appeal [for a unified 
Muslim platform]" (ibid.: 27). 
To the forum, a mapping of the country's Muslim population would also be 
crucial to the internal cohesion of the Muslim nation. Among its goals would 
be (and remains) the preparation of "data on all the madrasas and mosques 
in Nepal," (ibid.: 5) for they would need to determine the topography of its 
constituents in order to effectively cultivate a unified national awareness. The 
lack of reliable information on the numbers, locations, and types of madrasas 
and mosques in the country renders the community reliant upon occasional 
regional studies sponsored by the government and government census data, 
which many Muslims do not trust.15 This new information would alert the 
forum to districts that may not have sufficient madrasas or mosques to serve 
their localities, and would also make the committee aware of institutions and 
populations in the northern and western hill regions, for example, that may be 
as of yet unknown to the forum because of its base in the Kathmandu valley 
and orientation towards the Tarai. 
As part of this mapping, the forum called for the government to "make a 
report on Nepali Muslims' true population" (ibid.: 5). This stems from the 
long held suspicion among Muslims that government census data on the 
Muslim population is inaccurate (a feeling shared by Dalits, indigenous 
nationalities, and Madhesis). Some believe the population is most likely 
between 8 to 10 percent of the entire national population, as opposed to 4.2 
percent, the amount determined in the most recent government census of 
2001. In my various interviews and discussions with Muslim leaders, they 
expressed concerns about flaws in the methodology used in the census enu-
meration, flaws that they believe account for the low numbers assigned to the 
Muslim population in the 2001 census. The first of these is that the census 
delineates categories for identification that are sometimes overlapping. 
Muslim groups of certain ethnicities get counted in their particular ethnic 
group category to the exclusion of the Muslim category because it, too, is a 
designated ethnic group in the census taxonomy. An example of this is the 
group of Muslims enumerated in the census and referred to as Churaute, 
Muslims in the hills who are of the traditional bangle-selling profession and 
who are enumerated under their own category in the census.16 Their numbers 
therefore go towards the Churaute category at the expense of the Muslim 
category in the count of the adherents of various religions. 
In asking the state to see them as Muslims first and foremost, the forum 
seeks to empower these groups (as it sees it) by linking them with the larger 
group of Muslims that may receive rights and privileges based on its size. In 
the forum's view, religion should be all Muslims' primary source of identifi-
cation, and so all Muslims in these subcategories should be, as it sees it, 
enumerated as such in the census. The forum's second concern regarding the 
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census is with government corruption and the potential bias at work in the 
collection of census data. Some suspect that census-takers, when arriving in a 
remote or unfamiliar village, may ask any available resident about the religious 
composition of the village rather than directly collecting the information 
themselves, and as a result may receive an inaccurate or biased report. 
The National Muslim Forum aims to cultivate Muslim cohesion and iden-
tity among the population also by standardizing institutions of religious 
learning. A primary goal is the re-haul and systematization of madrasa edu-
cation across the country. In Nepal, a broad based Muslim identity cannot 
come from a rcligio-legal structuring of social and religious life through 
implementation of sharia, nor has it yet to come through formal institutions 
of discursive learning. The forum called for "all those responsible leaders of 
madrasas" to come "together for a meeting to think long and hard about 
madrasa problems [in this country]" (ibid.: 5). It would standardize madrasa 
curriculum in Nepal by bringing together the country's ulama (formally 
trained religious scholars) to decide upon the most effective curriculum for 
training Muslims to pursue either religious scholarship or secular professions. 
One Muslim affiliated with the National Muslim Forum explained to me that 
the aim is to create a Muslim Education Board in Nepal that would decide 
upon a countrywide code of curriculum, similar to Muslim education boards 
in India. By streamlining and standardizing the curriculum of madrasas 
across the country, the government would be more likely to recognize the 
legitimacy of madrasa education and certify madrasa diplomas. Some argue 
that if madrasas become certified, then there will be higher numbers of 
attendance, something that the Forum, as well as other organizations such as 
the Islami Sangh Nepal, sees as essential in the strengthening of Muslim 
identity.17 
Another way of helping to bring about this unity, the forum states, would 
be to make consistent the methods of moon sighting (U., hilal). The sighting 
of the crescent moon determines the beginning of Islamic holidays and is 
therefore both a symbolic and actual tool for ritual standardization among a 
dispersed population. In Nepal, as in other places, there are competing 
methods between Muslims of Barelvi orientation and those of other north 
Indian schools of thought such as the Deobandi and Ahl-e Hadis for deter-
mining the sighting of the crescent moon. To many Muslims, this difference in 
observance methods points to a troublesome sectarian division within the 
population, observable along the tangible lines of religious practice. It splinters 
the community practically and symbolically. To help mitigate these divisions 
at the important times of religious practice, the forum called for the creation 
of a "Hilal Committee" (or "Moon Committee," U., "chand committee"), 
which would synchronize the time that these religious observances begin 
throughout the country. When the two major Islamic holidays, Eid ul-Fitr 
and Eid ul-Azha, were declared national holidays in 2008, a Hilal committee 
was formed in order create consensus in the moon sighting process necessary 
for declaring their commencement. As of 2009-10, the Vice President of the 
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National Muslim Forum also served as the Hilal committee President and 
Kathmandu representative. 
With secularism, a new religious voice? 
In the spirit of the historical movement of the people's protest for political 
change in 2006, the National Muslim Forum sought to represent the Muslim 
community alongside various other ethnic and religious minorities in "pre-
senting [their] demands ... for the guarantee of the rights of every class and 
religion" (National Muslim Forum Nepal 2006: 1). As the forum explained in 
its publication of demands presented in 2006, and as many of its members 
reiterated in conversations with me: 
Muslims cannot be separate from the political changes that we are wit-
nessing in the country. In the planning and management of the country's 
matters, every religion and every class needs a reasonable share. In terms 
of the results of the present political changes, those establishing the new 
Constituent Assembly, and the new Constitution, Muslims' representation 
and the guarantee of their rights needs to be organized. 
(Ibid.) 
In highlighting Muslims' attachment and claim to Nepal, and by extension 
their legitimate claim to equal political representation and legal rights, the 
forum evoked the longevity of Muslim commitment to Nepal. It reminded 
Muslims and non-Muslims that Nepali Muslims' ties to the country are long 
and deep, for "Muslims have inhabited Nepal for centuries" (ibid.). It harkened 
back to the Muslim military support of Prithvi Narayan Shah in unifying 
Nepal in the late eighteenth century, during which time, "in the making of 
this country's history, Muslims performed an important role" (ibid.). 
In the forum's view, the designation of Nepal as a secular state ensures that 
for "people of all religions [to be] treated equally" and allows no religion to 
receive special status. This crucial first step towards secularization would lead 
to an improvement in the condition of Muslims in Nepal by ensuring "the 
freedom to each citizen to follow and live according to the teachings of his or 
her religion" (ibid.). While Muslims were legally free to practice their religion 
prior to this, as non-Hindus they were neither encouraged nor empowered to 
seek religiously based legal and political rights. They were required to adhere 
to inheritance, marriage, divorce laws, etc. that were influenced by Hindu 
norms and values (Lawoti 2005). In order to ensure these rights, the forum 
holds that the Muslim community must be guaranteed political representation, 
"according to their population," for "the heart of democracy is that the popu-
lations of every religion, language, and region are represented in the government's 
affairs and legal framework" (National Muslim Forum 2006: 3).18 
The forum cited the United Nation's International Human Rights Com-
mission's policies, instituted in 1947, of "prohibiting the classification and/or 
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discrimination (U., tafriq) on the bases of religion, language, caste, brother-
hoods, or political affiliation" (ibid.). Invoking this external arbiter of rights, 
the forum called attention to the declaration wherein "the power of religious 
minorities is also a priority ... the common political rights in the documents 
guarantee the flourishing of every religion, language, and society" (ibid.: 2). 
Even in Nepal, which has suffered from protracted political instability, "the 
safety of the rights of religious minorities must be safeguarded in this way" 
(ibid.: 3). The Nepali state, "having already signed these international rules 
and regulations," must "follow this commitment" (ibid.). Calling upon this 
external body of legal and humanitarian authority, the forum highlighted the 
failure of the Nepali state to live up to the standards of international law and 
justice in the past and underscored the forum's expectation that the state 
would adhere to these international standards in the future state. 
By extension, the forum called for the creation of a committee that would 
"manage the eradication of hatred against religious, linguistic, and regional 
minorities" (ibid.). This demand clearly addressed King Gyanendra's govern-
ment's suspected complicity in the violence against the Muslim community on 
Kalo Buddhvar. Muslim leaders believe the Pashupati Sena and Shiv Sena 
Nepal were emboldened and given a green light by the monarch to destroy 
Muslim sacred sites and property. Following the King's abdication of absolute 
sovereignty and the declaration of Nepal as a secular state, Hindutva groups 
from India and their Nepali counterparts became increasingly proprietary 
about Nepal as a Hindu country and increasingly vocal about the supposed 
threat to Hinduism posed by other religions in a secular state. Such groups 
quickly emerged fomenting aggression towards those supporting non-Hindu 
religious and social rights in the former Hindu state (Sangraula 2006). 
Ensuring that these groups arc monitored and restricted in the new government 
was - and continues to be - a matter of great importance to the National 
Muslim Forum. 
The forum from the outset has viewed the Muslim situation as distinct 
from that of other minorities in the country and entirely different from that of 
the indigenous nationalities (adivasi janjatis). It nevertheless invoked them in 
its earliest discourses as setting a precedent for minority groups obtaining 
constitutional rights that would accommodate their religious practices. As the 
forum sees it, "in the recent past all fifty-nine minorities (U., qaba'il, 'tribes' 
or 'families') - janjati - in Nepal were accepted in the 1990 constitution of the 
government and they legally obtained various facilities. But the status of 
Muslims along these lines has never been clear" (National Muslim Forum 
2006: 3).19 
The forum made several demands to the government that it thought would 
help to make clear to the government what Muslims require legally to culti-
vate a pan-Nepali Muslim identity and be supported within the new secular 
state. Among these demands were governmental protection for the "Muslim 
language of Urdu" (ibid.: 4) the declaration of Eid ul-Fitr, Eid ul-Azha and 
Milad ul-Nabi as national holidays, the certification of madrasa diplomas, 
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and the eventual establishment of a madrasa board for monitoring issues 
pertaining to Muslim education. It called for the creation of a Muslim 
Development Committee "in order to determine the true number of Muslims 
in Nepal, to save their language, society, customs, traditions (U., Islami tehazib 
o siqafaf), and identity (U., tashakhos), and to research and study their pro-
blems" (ibid.: 4). Other demands on their list were more specific, such as a 
call for easier acquisition of Nepali citizenship papers, which is a significant 
issue for Muslims of the Tarai who often do not have documentation of their 
place of birth and arc suspected to be (and perhaps sometimes are) Indian.20 
The forum even called for a Muslim personal law board, which would work 
to establish a provision in Nepali law for the application of Islamic law in 
personal law matters, though it recognizes that the possibility of such a legal 
privilege in Nepal (which itself would be highly contested within the Muslim 
population) would be unlikely.21 
Conclusion 
In cultivating a discourse that cast the diverse population of Muslims as a 
"nation," the National Muslim Forum from its beginning posited an inherent 
unity among Nepal's Muslims that aimed to transcend the population's many 
points of difference. While often "movements of identity politics take efforts 
to stabilize a particular identity at the expense of another one" (Sokcfcld 
2003: 327), the National Muslim Forum's positing of a Muslim religious 
identity that is national in scope can be seen as an example of a movement of 
identity politics that has sought from its beginning to stabilize two distinct 
identities - national and religious - in and through one another, not at the 
expense of one another. At its beginning, the National Muslim Forum con-
ceptualized a new Nepali Muslim identity at the country level that would be 
informed by both Muslim experiences in Nepal and the larger political 
environment of the country. In advocating for the Muslim population's rights 
and representation, the forum began firmly, in direct response to religious 
violence against Muslims, on the path of politicization of a pan-Nepali 
Muslim identity at a time of great political transition in the country. This time 
of both countrywide political change and Muslim self-reflection following a 
traumatic experience of violence compelled serious engagement with the 
question of how to survive and prosper as a religious minority in a newly 
secular state defined by a larger arena of contemporary identity politics. 
Moving forward towards the progress of both "nations," the National 
Muslim Forum Nepal concerns itself with both the larger political needs of a 
nascent secular Nepal as well as with the bonds of religious tradition. 
Notes 
1 The analysis in this paper is based on the Urdu publications of the National 
Muslim Forum and personal interviews with its members and leaders condueted in 
** 
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2005 6, 2008, and 2009 in the Kathmandu valley and Nepalgunj. All translations 
from the Urdu arc the author's. 
2 A number of Muslims claim that this number is inaccurately low due to methodological 
inconsistencies in the census, and that their population is closer to 10 percent. 
3 Hanafi is the term for one of the four schools of legal thought in Sunni Islam, 
named after Abu Hanifa of eighth century Iraq, to whom the school's origins are 
attributed. It is the most widespread school of Islamic legal thought in the world 
and is followed in South Asia. There is no provision in Nepali law for the appli-
cation of Islamic law in criminal, civil or personal law matters and so the identification 
reflects a general orientation towards the school of law traditionally followed in 
India. 
4 Hence they are largely of the ajlaf castes, those believed to be dcsccndcnts of South 
Asian converts to Islam. This is in contrast to hill Muslims who often claim 
Turkish ancestry and arc referred to as ashraf. Whelpton writes, "There is a wide-
spread oral tradition among both Hindus and Muslims living there [in the Tarai] 
today that their ancestors moved into the area only about 200 years ago, which was 
around the time of the Gorkhali conquest of the Kathmandu valley." Sec John 
Whelpton, A History of Nepal (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 15. I spoke with one Muslim man in Kathmandu who believed his 
ancestral lineage in the Tarai to be of the Muslim regiment of Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq 
of Delhi when he seized the Tarai city of Simraungarha in the fourteenth century. 
5 Barclvis, also known as Ahl al-Sunnah wa'1-Jamah (People of the Prophet's Sunna 
and the Community), are a group of religious scholars and their followers, founded 
in India in the 1880s. Barclvis emphasize the primacy of Islamic law and the con-
tinual intercession of the Prophet Muhammad with God on the behalf of Muslims. 
They believe that saints are essential to Muslims' relationship with the Prophet 
Muhammad and God. 
6 Deobandis are a group of religious scholars, and their followers, associated with 
the influential Islamic madrasa located in Deoband, northwest of Delhi, founded 
in 1867. They emphasize the traditional sciences of the Quran and Hadith. The 
definitive work on the history of Deoband is Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British 
India: Deoband, I860 1900. 
7 Ahl-e Hadith ("People of the Prophetic Tradition"), or Ahl-i Hadith, are Muslims 
who are part of a movement that originated in nineteenth century India that 
rejected the authority of the schools of Islamic law and instead gave primacy to the 
traditions of the Prophet and the Quran in matters of faith and practice. 
8 Jama'at-i Islami is an Islamist political party in Pakistan, founded in Lahore in 
1941 by Maulana Sycd Abu al-A'la Mawdudi, with independent branches in India 
and Bangladesh. It was See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic-
Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994), and more recently Irfan Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy in India: 
The Transformation of the Jama'at-i Islami, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2009). 
9 Following the National Muslim Forum's first meeting and the simultaneous accel-
eration of identity politics that emerged with the writing of the Interim Constitu-
tion, Madhesi organizations called for greater representation in the central 
government, and even for a separate state. They became a major political challenge 
within Nepali politics. There is a Muslim faction of the Madhesi Janadhikar 
Forum, but the National Muslim Forum claims no ties with it. 
10 This terrorist group in Iraq was Ansar al-Sunna (Army of the Protectors of the 
Sunna), which had alleged ties to al-Qaeda. 
11 In its early years it forged connections with overseas Islamic organizations for the 
translation of "Islamic books and brochures" and established the current Islamic 
library in Ghanta Ghar. Today the Islamic library holds over 10,000 titles in Urdu, 
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English, Hindu, Nepali, and Arabic. It is also registered with the government as an 
NGO and runs a health clinic for the poor, as part of its da'wah. The organization 
also has a website: www.islaminnepal.com/EN/index.html 
12 Usage in the Nepali language of the Arabic term muluk for the sense of "nation" 
dates back to the early nineteenth century, when it was used, for example, in the 
title of the national legal code, the Muluki Ain. The inclusion of Arabic and 
Persian terms in Nepali court language was common from the time of the Malla 
Kings in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, who modeled numerable aspects of 
their imperial culture after the powerful Mughal court to the south. See Mary 
Shepherd Slusser, Nepal Mandala: A Cultural Study of the Kathmandu Valley, 2 
vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 68 69. 
13 See Slusser, Nepal Mandala: A Cultural Study of the Kathmandu Valley. 
14 The concept of development pervades political and social discourse in Nepal, and 
by extension the concept pervades Muslim reflections on the state of their own 
population. 
15 H. Md. Zahid Parwez, J. B. Rana, Pasang Shcrpa and Prakash Swayam, 'Access of 
Muslim Children to Education (Phase II)', in Formative Research Project (Kath-
mandu: Tribhuvan University Research Center for Educational Innovation and 
Development, 2004). 
16 I thank Hamid Ansari for sharing his insights into these issues. 
17 It is well known that madrasas often serve to educate Muslim students whose 
families cannot afford any other type of schooling for their children. Families who can 
afford to may send their children to mixed curriculum schools instead of madrasas. 
18 It also highlights its status as the second largest religious minority in Nepal 
according to the most recent census. Some Muslims I spoke to cited the Madhesi 
government quota system, whereby the Tarai population receives a certain quota 
of political representation to better balance the political representation with the 
population distribution of the country. Sec, for example, Prakash Dubcy, 'Muslim 
Minority Wants Quotas in Parliament and Civil Service', Asia News, April 15, 2007. 
19 The Constitution was promulgated in 1990, but indigenous groups attained such 
recognition only in the second half of the nineties. 
20 Many Muslims in the Tarai, like other Madhesis, do not have proof of their Nepali 
citizenship, for it is not needed in crossing the border to India. When as adults they 
apply to the Nepali government for citizenship documents they have a difficult time 
obtaining them, as the government turns down their applications in fear that they 
may be Indians feigning Nepali birth in order to obtain a Nepali passport. A 
recent article that discusses this issue is Vijay Kanta Kama, 'Most of the Madheshi 
People Are Losing Their Identity since They Arc Treated as "Less Nepali" or 
"Non-Nepali" by Pahadi People', Telegraph Nepal, 2007. 
21 Muslims I interviewed and spoke with had varying opinions about the need for, as 
well as the feasibility of, the implementation of Islamic law in Nepal. The pursuit 
of Muslim Personal Law in Nepal seems to be gaining increasing momentum 
among members of the Forum now. 
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